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From the Staff

The important lessons learned for all personnel to know are in the field with you, not with us. The JCLL has the mission and the means to share those lessons with the rest of the joint community. If you or your unit have a "lesson" that could help others do it right the first time, then send it to us. Don't wait until you have a polished article. The JCLL can take care of the editing, format, and layout. We want the raw material that can be packaged and then shared with everyone. Please take the time to put your good ideas on paper and get them to the JCLL. We will acknowledge receipt and then work with you to put your material in a publishable form with **you as the author**.

We want your e-mail address! We will soon have the capability to electronically disseminate the bulletin to you when it is published. You can sign up for this service in the bulletin section of our website listed below.

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TIMELY SUBMISSION OF INTERIM REPORTS, AFTER-ACTION REPORTS, AND LESSONS LEARNED RESULTS IN MORE TIMELY, QUALITY PRODUCTS AND ANALYSIS FROM THE JCLL STAFF.

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Message from the Deputy Commander

BG JAMES B. SMITH, USAF
Deputy Commander, JFCOM JWFC

The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is committed to providing the best support possible to enable you to perform your missions. I want to assure you of my support and invite you to submit any ideas, suggestions, or lessons learned articles to the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL). The Bulletin is designed to stimulate your professional thought and foster discussion by sharing ideas and lessons.

In this issue of the JCLL Bulletin we have an excellent array of articles, beginning with the introduction of a series on ***Realizing The Information Operations Concept Within The JTF Structure***, by Mr. Dave Collins, an Intelligence Analyst with the JWFC Exercise Analysis Branch. Mr. Collins gives us an overview of the information operations process and its synchronization with other intelligence functions.

The second article, ***Deadly Force Is Authorized, But Also Trained***, is written by LTC Mark Martins, who served as Chief of Staff and Legal Adviser for US Kosovo Forces. His article gives a rebuttal to some points made by Col Hays Parks, USMC (Ret), in his article ***Deadly Force Is Authorized***, which appeared in the March 2001 Bulletin (Volume III Issue 2). LTC Martins discusses the standing rules of engagement and their applicability to the situation in Kosovo.

In the article, ***Combat Search And Rescue–Basic Factors***, LTC Darrel Whitcomb, USAF (Ret), discusses five factors relevant to search and rescue in a combat environment. He concludes his article with examples of rescues from World War II, Korea, and the present situation in Bosnia.

Our next article is part three of the series, ***Integrating Joint Operations Beyond The FSCL: Is Current Doctrine Adequate?*** by LTC Dwayne Hall, USA. In this section LTC Hall discusses graphic and doctrinal control measures and their implications in cooperation between the joint forces.

The Joint Lessons Learned Program...A Common Framework, by Col Egon Hawrylak, USA, details the purpose and framework of the Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Program. Our final article, ***JCLL, Experiment Lessons, and Continuous Transformation***, by Mr. Matt Slater, discusses the need for capturing lessons learned from joint experiments. Mr. Slater views experimentation as a source of lessons learned, along with training exercises and real-world operations.



JAMES B. SMITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Commander
Joint Warfighting Center

JCLL Update

Mr. Mike Barker
JCLL Director

Since the last Bulletin was published, major changes have occurred to the Joint Staff J7 organization. The biggest change was the dissolution of the Joint Exercise Analysis Division (JEAD) along with the Joint Assessment Team (JAT). Through retirements and PCSs, those remaining from the old JEAD section have been moved and integrated into the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Division (JDETD). Those of you who currently work lessons learned and the Remedial Action Program (RAP) have already met CDR (S) Ted Cowan. New to the Joint Staff is LTC Victoria Calhoun who will be helping CDR Cowan with both programs. Not necessarily new to the Joint Staff, but new to lessons learned and RAP, are CAPT Bruce Russell and COL Keith Wagner. You should see continued emphasis on lessons learned and improving the lessons learned process.

Within the next several weeks, the Joint Warfighting Center will be letting a new contract. The joint community shouldn't see anything different regarding the Joint Center for Lessons Learned and the support we provide. The POCs you talked to last week will be the same POCs once the new contract goes into effect. The change you won't readily see, however, will be JCLL's involvement with a new analysis section that will be performing Root Cause and Trends Analysis. The products out of this new analysis effort will be "white papers" to be presented to the Joint Staff to help with the issue resolution process.

One of the capabilities we will soon have available is the ability to "push" out each bulletin as an e-mail attachment. If you have a difficult time getting a hard copy of the Bulletin or trying to download it from our web site, you may want to consider signing up to get a copy direct. Keep checking our homepage to sign up when it becomes available.

It's been a frustrating year for us in JCLL. For over a year we have not been able to update the database. The JAARs you send us are being placed in a temp folder until the day arrives that we can import them into the database. In a nutshell, we had been using a dos-based application to manage the database. Windows 2000 put an end to that. This is something we've been mentioning in the last several Bulletins. Our fix is to adopt an Air Force program for joint use which we are calling JALLT – Joint Automated Lessons Learned Tool. Well, today is Christmas in August. I just received a call from the Joint Staff that the funding request we had submitted several months ago was just approved by the Chairman. The search and import capability should be up and available in the next several weeks. The remainder of the program, which the CINCs are most interested in, should be available before the end of the year.

That wraps up this edition. Keep checking our web site for the latest information concerning the next Worldwide Joint Lessons Learned Conference and the Joint Lessons Learned Program Configuration Management Board.

Contents

Realizing the Information Operations Concept within the Joint Task Force (JTF) Structure

Mr. David Collins
JWFC Intelligence Analyst

Conceptual visualization is one of the most meaningful ways to explore the future of any human endeavor. It is said that whatever can be conceived can be realized. This is certainly true of information operations (IO). However, as with many such concepts, some degree of revision and refinement may be expected before reaching a successful end state. Said another way, the principle of trial and error applies. A variety of techniques may be used for such exploration (e.g., scholastic research, laboratory experimentation, computer simulations, and real-world experience). This article will explore IO experiences through the experience provided by joint task force training exercises. In particular, what follows is based on first-hand observation while assessing the capabilities of numerous JTF staffs and their IO activities over the past five years.

The key to successful operational application of IO lies in understanding its concept. The functional elements of IO necessary to achieve the IO mission statement as defined in JP 1-02, "Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems" have been around for a long time. Affecting adversary information systems and defending our own is nothing new. Some aspects, such as available technologies have certainly changed, but the underlying principles have not. Despite the existence of literally thousands of pages on the subject (to include joint doctrinal publications) JTF staffs continue to have difficulty making it work. While there is no simple answer regarding this situation, the core reasons are fairly straightforward. Successful operational use of IO entails more than a "sum of the parts" approach. Viewed individually each active participant of IO is a mature discipline with well-established operating processes and procedures (figure 1). [1]



Figure 1 – Information Operations: Capabilities and Related Activities

DOD has trained and employed generations of subject matter experts for these areas (PSYOP, EW, etc). Unfortunately, this often results in the incorrect conclusion that the best way to execute IO is through the aggregation of these disciplines under a single coordinating authority (e.g., an IO cell (figure 2)). [2]



Figure 2 – Typical Joint Information Operations Cell

Repeated attempts to apply this approach during JTF training exercises have revealed five significant issues in how IO cells operate while trying to achieve the conceptual goals of IO.

First is the issue of organizational structure. A thoughtful assessment seldom occurs during the activation of the JTF on how to arrange organic IO staff assets to best support mission requirements. For example, will the IO cell staff function be performed in a centralized or decentralized manner? Will IO cell members be full time, part-time, or on call? Also generally lacking is an assessment of the supporting/supported relationships of the various IO staff elements, which is key to determining the priority/preponderance of effort. When such issues are considered, the results are generally viewed as a "fixed" position. Usually it is not significantly influenced by either unanticipated mission dynamics or preplanned events (e.g., operational phase transition).

The second JTF IO issue is that of determining the procedural differences between "business as usual" for the individual IO elements and those required to successfully plan and execute IO. Without such understanding, the operational synergy that is the strategic vision behind the IO concept will not occur.

The third issue is the lack of an effective mechanism by which operational requirements for IO staff action are identified and tasked. This is true for requirements that are self-initiated by the IO staff, those that are raised by the JTF HQ staff at large, and those that originate externally to the JTF HQ. While certainly interrelated, each also have unique aspects to their associated staff dynamics.

The fourth issue, related to the previous one, involves a lack of clarity on how IO targets are identified, validated,

prioritized, and serviced. This includes procedures to ensure the visibility and synchronization of IO targeting actions within the JTF targeting process.

The final issue stems from the absence of a capability to effectively assess IO processes and procedures during the conduct of an operation and adjust if necessary. This is particularly true in such key areas as development and modification of measures of effectiveness and IO targeting assessment.

While it is certainly true that JTF exercise staffs continue to experience difficulty in their effort to come to grips with IO, we must be careful not to become myopic in assessing and interpreting its validity and value. The effort to integrate the highly matured processes and procedures that exist for each of the individual disciplines within IO cannot be expected to come quickly or easily. Many such concepts have undergone a similar metamorphosis from concept to operational asset (joint targeting coordination, all source intelligence fusion, etc). None emerged easily or made the trip rapidly. All impacted preexisting organizational structures, processes, and procedures, etc. Ultimately however, each of these clearly paid high dividends and are routinely employed in JTF operations today.

It should be noted that the shortfall in our effort to employ IO within the JTF structure continues to pose challenges that need to be addressed. In general, the IO portions of JTF training events have been executed by highly trained and motivated professional military personnel doing their best with the resources available. The fact that their efforts tend to be focused on their respective disciplines rather than on successfully integrating the IO concept reflects their evolutionary position of the IO concept. These exercises provide critical glimpses into the challenges we face in maturing the IO concept while also providing insight on how to achieve its full potential. They also strongly suggest that if amended, there are significant operational benefits to be gained.

This article merely scratched the surface regarding the issue of IO within the JTF. Future articles will discuss a number of these key points in using a two-phased approach. The first series will expand on the five key issues identified above and will include:

1) Structure and composition of the IO staff
2) Procedural modification required to integrate IO elements
3) Identification and tasking of IO requirements
4) Validation, prioritization, and management of IO targets
5) Assessment and dissemination of IO targeting results

Each of these articles will identify existing capabilities and procedures that can be employed in the integration of IO. Additionally, specific "seams"/shortfalls will be discussed. Finally, recommended courses of action will be explored on how to improve our understanding of IO and how it can be effectively employed to its full potential. Phase two articles will translate the procedural issues addressed in phase one in terms of operational application and will cover such topics as:

1) Synchronizing IO and intelligence activities
2) Integrating IO targeting into the JTF targeting process
3) Requirements for an integrated lethal/non-lethal fires effects assessment process

Note: JTF training exercises are an excellent opportunity for learning how to integrate and conduct IO. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned database currently contains thirty-seven IO associated entries submitted over the past three years. The effort to improve understanding and application of IO must actively leverage such venues to both identify and share significant lessons learned. The avenue for recording and bringing visibility to these improvements should be forwarded to the Joint Center for Lessons Learned via the Joint After-Action Reporting system in accordance with CJCSI 3150.25a, the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP).

Footnotes:

[1] Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 9 October 1998, Chapter I, page I-10.
[2] Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 9 October 1998, Chapter IV, page IV-3.

About the Author

Mr. David B. Collins is a retired USAF intelligence officer with extensive experience from the tactical to strategic national level intelligence. Currently employed as an intelligence analyst with the Exercise Analysis Branch of the Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Forces Command, Mr. Collins's experience includes diverse real-world operational experience with the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, United States Air Forces in Europe, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as over 180 Joint, combined, coalition, and service specific training exercises. Included among his published writings are over 70 intelligence articles and studies.

Below is a partial list of unclassified reports from the JCLL Current JAAR database that discuss Information Operations.

Information Operations

Number	*Operation/Exercise*	*Title*
10659-90309	Fuertes Defenses 98/99	Assessment-OP 5.6 Employ Operations/Information Warfare
20839-16303	Unified Endeavor 98-1	Assessment-Information Operations/Information Warfare
22353-16315	JTFEX 98-1	Observation-Joint Vision 2010
37037-01452	Agile Lion 99	Observation-Information Operations Matrix
57807-13029	Cooperative Nugget 99	Observation-Information Operations

Deadly Force is Authorized, But Also *Trained*

By Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. Martins, U.S. Army

By sparking old and easy biases, Hays Parks obscures the training imperatives that provide clues to better rules of engagement.

In the January issue of *Naval Institute Proceedings*, retired Colonel Hays Parks warns that restrictive and unsuitable rules of engagement (ROE) today handicap and endanger U.S. forces, especially ground troops on peace-support missions. Identifying the problem as one of ignorance on the part of individual Marines, sailors, and soldiers, including service judge advocates, over when deadly force is authorized, Parks sounds an alarm that America's young men and women in uniform "need to know when they may resort to deadly force to protect their lives."

Parks' Argument

Parks second-guesses assorted decisions in which ground troops have refrained from opening fire, suggesting these decisions were caused by foolish ROE. In one of these examples, he derides the official commendation of a young U.S. Army sergeant whose platoon held its fire even as he and his soldiers were being struck by Bosnian Serbs bearing rocks and clubs. This was a situation in which, Parks urges, the soldiers were "legally entitled to use deadly force." In another example, he cites unspecified "Kosovo beatings" to illustrate risks faced by peace-support forces. Parks maintains that these and other instances of restraint are "representative rather than isolated incidents," and he cautions that "operating under bad ROEs invites mission failure, usually with fatal consequences to men and women who deserve better."

Parks' extended argument is sweeping in scope and damning in tone. He condemns the current Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)—a document that has evolved from maritime origins and contains tolerably clear guidance for commanding officers on the open seas—as a poor vehicle for commanders to inform individuals in port or on the ground when they may use deadly force to protect themselves and others. The lack of commanders' "tools" in the SROE on the matter of individual self defense, he claims, combined with a propensity for micromanagement on the part of senior administration officials naïve to the bad things that can happen when force is used, has resulted in peace-support ROE that place servicemen and women at undue risk.

Parks further argues that military lawyers writing ROE for field commands compound the problem. They misapply international law, he says, cut and paste ROE from bogus sources, fail to read United States court decisions relating to use of deadly force by domestic law enforcement agents, and ignore basic truths about wound ballistics and close-quarter marksmanship under stress.

Parks holds military commanders ultimately responsible, however, because they delegate ROE drafting and training to lawyers, because they hide behind ROE to avoid making tough decisions, because they rarely have the spine to stand up to civilian leaders when restrictive rules are being imposed, or because they fail to provide soldiers, sailors, and marines sufficient firearms training to be effective in a gunfight or other violent confrontation.

At various points during this argument, Parks suggests curative measures. The most important of these appears to be the military's adoption, with input from Navy Special Warfare and Army and Marine Corps infantry representatives, of a uniform deadly force policy and training system similar to that used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Colonel Parks contends that every young American on point for the nation should know to defend himself when attacked. Parks' aims are undoubtedly noble, and his track record is that of someone who has wrestled with the predicaments faced by individual soldiers, sailors, and Marines for much of his professional life. Certainly, his recommendation for meaningful involvement by ground force commanders in top-level policy on use of force also has considerable merit.

Respectfully, Sir, That's Not Quite Right

Still, there is much to disagree with in his argument, at least as he presents it in *Proceedings*. He overstates several premises and incompletely recounts important facts. More significant, he mistakes the problem—subtly but critically—at its core.

Individual soldiers, sailors, and marines facing bad actors or nasty crowds get no help from legal formulas for when deadly force is authorized. The document used by the FBI and offered by Parks as a model states that "the necessity to use deadly force arises when all other available means of preventing imminent and grave danger to officers or other persons have failed or would be likely to fail" and that use of deadly force "must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances known to the officer at the time." To know these verbal incantations is

to know nothing particularly helpful in a jam.

Far more important to a soldier in a firefight are those trained reactions that enable the soldier to deal with the bad actor appropriately and before the bad actor can do him harm. Far more important to a soldier facing a nasty crowd are those trained actions that produce a conditioned response and enable the unit to accomplish its task and purpose while protecting the force. The successful missions performed by thousands of brave and dedicated young Americans in the Balkans are the strongest evidence available that leaders have gone well beyond merely authorizing deadly force: they have ensured that soldiers and units are well-trained and equipped for the situations they face.

Ready and Willing to Fire, If Necessary

On the morning of 7 March of this year, United States Army soldiers moved by foot into the village of Mijak, near the border between Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), with the mission of conducting a search for weapons and armed ethnic Albanian guerrillas that had been reported in the town. They secured the town and began entering buildings in their search. At about 9 a.m. an armed man walked toward soldiers at an observation point. The soldiers detained him. Minutes later, five armed men departed one of the buildings under observation. The men maneuvered toward the soldier's position, took up firing positions, and oriented weapons toward the soldiers. The soldiers fired their weapons, wounding two of the men. One of the men was shot in the abdomen and in the leg. The other man who was shot was dragged by unknown individuals into a nearby building, and his condition remains unknown. No United States soldiers were injured. There was no second-guessing of the soldiers' decision to shoot their armed adversaries.

The Mijak incident is not unusual. Between June 1999 and May 2000, the month when Parks was defending the honor of American military men and women in Sandhurst against ninja turtle jokes delivered by British officers, American soldiers and marines in Kosovo were executing tens of thousands of squad-size missions, some of them deadly violent. In contrast to the suggestion by Parks that U.S. forces in the Balkans are trigger shy and cowering within their shells, these data support a different picture—one of seriousness and strength.

The soldiers who accomplished their mission at Mijak did so because they and their unit were well trained for that scenario. In basic rifle marksmanship, trained first upon initial entry, periodically thereafter, and again in the weeks immediately prior to heading to Kosovo, the soldiers fired hundreds of rounds from prone and foxhole positions at popup silhouette targets between 50 and 300 meters away. Basic marksmanship requires aiming at center of mass and mastery of siting, breathing, and adjusting windage or elevation.

Close-Quarters Training: Hard But Effective

Because the unit was infantry and likely to be given cordon-search, checkpoint, and similar missions in built-up areas, soldiers also received many hours of close quarters combat training. This involved repetitive and stressful training, on several Fort Bragg ranges, of close quarters techniques. These included methods of movement, firing stances, weapon positioning, and reflexive shooting.

These discriminating techniques were devised with appreciation for precisely the physiological responses and wound ballistics Parks discovered at the FBI Academy. The techniques are properly touted in Army doctrine as the most effective way to accomplish Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) missions that have turned violent "while minimizing friendly losses, avoiding unnecessary noncombatant casualties, and conserving ammunition and demolitions for subsequent operations."

Although the soldiers at Mijak never needed it, reflexive shooting, and specifically the "aimed quick kill" technique, requires the most practice. It involves a departure of point of aim from "center of mass," taught in basic training, to the center of the cranium. Parks notes that a shot so placed is more likely to achieve rapid incapacitation. Such a shot also avoids the protective vests that may be worn by adversaries.

Early in the unit's preparation, infantry rifle squads also conducted collective live fire training on the most fundamental of battle drills—React to Contact. This drill forms the nucleus of the rifle squad's collective skill set.

IRT, STX and Mission Rehearsal

Effective training with issued weapons was part of a comprehensive predeployment training program designed specifically to ensure that soldiers could handle situations such as that which developed at Mijak. Individual readiness training (IRT) and situational training exercises (STX) featuring uncooperative roleplayers confronted soldiers and squads with a variety of dangerous situations, including snipers, landmines, crowd disturbances, criminal acts by Kosovars, and speeding vehicles and armed persons at checkpoints. Immediately prior to deployment, the unit underwent an intensive Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)—a heavily resourced, culminating, individual and collective training event designed to test soldiers, teams, and leaders in a stressful, Kosovo-like environment.

The most recent MRE, held at the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana, replicated the towns, movement routes, base camps, and border areas of the Multinational Brigade (East) area, that part of the Kosovo province secured by United States forces. In addition to reinforcing all of the individual and team tasks

already trained, the MRE gave soldiers and leaders firsthand experience with interpreters speaking the Balkan tongues, with civil authorities, nongovernmental officials and private international organizations, with officers from the Polish and Greek battalions serving alongside U.S. forces in Kosovo, and with the specific demographics, economic, and security characteristics of individual neighborhoods.

At the MRE, soldiers and leaders practiced not only fire and movement against ethnic albanian armed guerrillas, but also effective use of an interpreter and negotiation based on principle; not only how to call for air or artillery support, but also how to coordinate operations with international police forces in the area. The price tag? An estimated 11 million dollars. It was not cheap, to be sure, yet few who have experienced an MRE—and seen how well it prepares soldiers and units to accomplish a difficult mission and come safely home—doubt that it is money well spent.

The Standing ROE: Find Another Punching Bag

Some of Parks' criticism of the SROE is overdone and obscures the true nature of the challenge commanders face in providing clear guidance to ground troops on self defense. It is true that the SROE acknowledges United States commitments under the United Nations Charter—and indeed all of its international agreements—because any responsible national security policy document must do so.

Reasonable people can disagree with Park's statement that "[n]othing in the history of the Charter suggests that it was intended to apply to the actions of individual service personnel . . . " because the Charter expressly incorporates previously assumed international obligations, among which are treaties and customary law dealing with war crimes. Because an individual defendant can plead self-defense to a criminal charge as a matter of international law, just as a defendant in an excessive use of force prosecution can plead self defense under U.S. domestic law, Parks' statement is not strictly correct. Also, regardless of personal self-defense guarantees under international law, the SROE is replete with caveats which make clear that no international obligation may be interpreted to infringe upon individual self defense.

One of these caveats was expressly invoked by Army judge advocates in late 1999, when the response suggested by NATO attorneys at higher headquarters to a hypothetical but very possible encounter with the "Mad Mortarman" infringed upon self defense as captured in the SROE. The caveat states that

US forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by the NCA. US forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

The hypothetical scenario involved an individual who is discovered at the precise grid coordinate where a Q36 radar has acquired a mortar round being fired moments earlier. The individual's activities—running away from KFOR soldiers toward a nearby vehicle, carrying a mortar base plate—suggest complicity in a pattern of mortar attacks over the preceding weeks on various targets from nearby points. Some of those targets have been close to KFOR bases, and the attacks have claimed Kosovar lives, though no KFOR soldiers have been injured.

Army judge advocates in Kosovo correctly argued that even though the immediate attack appears to have ended, the individual's failure to obey commands to halt, along with his continuing ability and opportunity to fire again, constitute "hostile intent" sufficient to engage him with deadly force. In addition to informing higher NATO headquarters that U.S. forces would not be bound by the restrictive response suggested (i.e., not firing upon the fleeing mortarman), the Army lawyers quoted the SROE and offered examples from U.S. case law relating to fleeing felons.

Parks' frustration with the self-defense principles stated in the SROE is difficult to understand. The SROE boils self-defense into two major elements—necessity and proportionality. Necessity exists "when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorist(s) exhibits hostile intent." A proportionate response is one whose nature, duration, and scope do not exceed "that which is required to decisively counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of US forces or other protected personnel or property." When one gets past Parks' apparent suspicion of the SROE as a maritime rather than a ground force product, one strains to figure out his beef. True, the term "hostile intent" requires elaboration and further definition through concrete examples of intent indicators, and true, proportionality is a lawyerly balancing act of the type that irritates laymen.

Yet these are not problems unique to the SROE's formulation of individual self-defense. The FBI policy preferred by Parks also includes a version of "necessity" that is incomprehensible without reference to specific examples. Also, law enforcement officers in America comply with an unlabeled doctrine of proportionality, because necessity only arises "when all other available means of preventing imminent and grave danger to officers or other persons have failed or would be likely to fail."

Perhaps, as Parks urges, the SROE should contain the FBI policy's reminder that "the reasonableness of a decision to use deadly force must be viewed from the perspective of the man on the scene—who may often be forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—and without the advantage of 20/20 hindsight." This is a valuable standard that forecloses most second-guessing.

Which is More Confusing? More Restrictive?

Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy

Necessity.
The officer "may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person."

Reasonable Belief
"Probable cause, reason to believe or a reasonable belief, for purposes of this policy, means facts and circumstances, including the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, known to the officer at the time of the use of deadly force, that would cause a reasonable officer to conclude that the point at issue is probably true."

Mere Suspicion
"Deadly force should never be used upon mere suspicion that a crime, no matter how serious, was committed, or simply upon the officer's determination that probable cause would support the arrest of the person being pursued or arrested for the commission of a crime."

Non-Deadly Force
"If other force than deadly force reasonably appears to be sufficient to accomplish an arrest or otherwise accomplish the law enforcement purpose, deadly force is not necessary."

Verbal Warning
"If feasible and if to do so would not increase the danger to the officer or others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the officer shall be given prior to the use of deadly force."

Objective Reasonableness
"Use of deadly force must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances known to the officer at the time."

V.

SROE-Based Training Aid

R-A-M-P
(Army FM 27-100)
R-Return Fire with Aimed Fire. Return force with force. You always have the right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.
A-Anticipate Attack. Use force first if you see clear indicators of hostile intent.
M-Measure the amount of Force that you use, if time and circumstances permit. Use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.
P-Protect with deadly force only human life, and property designated by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other property.

Still, it is difficult to imagine a single scenario in which the self-defense standard under domestic federal law differs from the self-defense standard under the SROE. This notion, that by following United States SROE we are sacrificing soldiers' inalienable rights on the altar of international cooperation, simply does not persuade.

Making a Federal Case Out of Force Continuums

Parks is attracted to federal cases and policies relating to law enforcement use of deadly force. Yet law enforcement tasks, organization, weapons, and operations are different from military ones, and domestic legal fights over police use of deadly force are raised in contexts governed by distinct constitutional and statutory provisions. The military is properly wary of borrowing too much from a law enforcement model.

Parks' concern about what he calls "the level of force continuum" is understandable, but his broadside against military judge advocates is unfair. He states that lawyer-inspired ROE "require" gradualism, yet consider the cautions against gradualism excluded from Parks' incomplete quotation:

- "***If possible***, apply a graduated escalation of force."
- "Measure your force, ***if time and circumstances permit.***"
- "***Omit lower level . . . measures*** if the threat quickly grows deadly." "***Risks:*** Initiative may suffer if soldiers feel the need to progress sequentially through the measures on the scale."

Note also that deadly force is nowhere characterized in this training aid as a "last resort." It is easy to concur with Parks that "last resort" language should be expunged from the ROE vocabulary. This phrase can too easily be interpreted to mean that a shot must be last in a chronological sequence of measures.

Parks thus wrongly accuses fellow lawyers of imposing "an obligation to exhaust all other means before resorting to deadly force, even when deadly force is warranted." Morever, he seems to forget that law enforcement officers daily use techniques along a force continuum.

The scale of force is also firmly embedded within time-tested and effective techniques for dealing with the sort of large-scale civil disturbance that does not occur every day. In addition to verbal warnings, shoves, holds, and pepper spray, such techniques include use of riot sticks and shields, as well as extreme force options involving volley fire of nondeadly projectiles, and deadly force. Mentioning options such as use of pepper spray or firing of nonlethal weapons in the text of a training aid can create a healthy stimulus for leaders to obtain, issue and train soldiers on the equipment, because those who face crowd

confrontations will inevitably ask the sensible question, "Sir, when are we going to be issued pepper spray and sponge grenades?"

Parks' aversion to the level of force continuum is still more curious in light of the Justice Department's own requirement that a verbal warning be given, if feasible, and in view of its statement that "if other force than deadly force reasonably appears to be sufficient to accomplish an arrest or otherwise accomplish the law enforcement purpose, deadly force is not necessary."

Warning Shots: Don't Overuse, But Don't Ban

Parks' claim that "Justice Department Guidelines/U.S. Law . . . Prohibits warning shots" is not strictly correct. The Department's guidelines expressly permit warning shots in the prison context "if reasonably necessary to deter or prevent the subject from escaping from a secure facility" or "if reasonably necessary to deter or prevent the subject's use of deadly force or force likely to cause grievous bodily harm."

A ban on warning shots, such as that imposed by the Justice Department outside the prison context, is not necessarily the right thing for soldiers in MOOTW. To prohibit warning shots as Parks suggests would be to deny soldiers and leaders on the ground, who may suddenly encounter unarmed but unfriendly civilians without other nonlethal means at their disposal, a useful option for maintaining control of the situation and accomplishing the mission.

> In the official commentary to its deadly force policy, *The Department of Justice recognizes and respects the integrity and paramount value of all human life. Consistent with that primary value, but beyond the scope of the principles articulated here, is the Department's full commitment to take all reasonable steps to prevent the need to use deadly force, as reflected in Departmental training and procedures.*

The fact is that both Parks' preferred document and the training and procedures implementing that document contain a force continuum. They incorporate, in a wordy and confusing formula, the very proportionality principle he mocks.

Parks' claim that under military ROE Indiana Jones would be required to risk death by closing with his sword-wielding assailant in *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, is simply false. Under the "RAMP" training device outlined in U.S. Army doctrine, Indy's decision to shoot the threat is an excellent example of "A-Anticipate Attack," because Indy—like the Army soldiers who fired at Mijak in Kosovo—has seen hostile intent.

Whereas an FBI agent's training at the Academy in Quantico on a similar scenario might have emphasized the difference between "imminent" and "instantaneous" harm and helped him to understand the concept of "objective reasonableness," a soldier's training causes him to look at the subject's hands, activity, and weapon to judge whether he is under attack. Military training on the use of force specifically stresses that a soldier need neither take the first shot nor surrender an advantage provided by the standoff range of his weapon before killing an attacker. Measures of force, captured under the "M" in "RAMP," simply do not apply, and it is through repetitive training rather than talk that soldiers become conditioned to shoot vice measuring force in this scenario.

The "Shoot to Wound" Fallacy: A Straw Man

Parks' criticism of "shoot to wound," "shoot to disable," or "injure with fire," though understandable, is aimed at a straw man. Consider his comment that—

> Requirements to "shoot to wound" . . . indicate a serious lack of knowledge of the law, close-quarter marksmanship under stress against a hostile moving target, wound ballistics, and the impracticality of round counting in a gunfight."

This comment is misdirected because:

- the word "requirement" appears nowhere in any of the example training aids quoted by Parks, and training vignettes do not suggest a soldier should fire lethal munitions other than to kill;
- fire by a covered soldier aiming an M203 grenade launcher loaded with nonlethal munitions, even as other soldiers remain armed and ready with M16A2s, can be helpful in dispersing a crowd and maintaining control;
- Army close quarter marksmanship trainers are fully appreciative of the fact that rapid incapaci tation of the threat can generally be expected only with high velocity shots to the head, and shot placement for "reflexive shooting" is trained accordingly;
- much military training is dynamic and specifi cally designed to inculcate effective responses under the stress of a deadly force encounter, when visual narrowing, auditory exclusion, decreased fine motor skills, and other symptoms are to be expected.
- Parks is fixated on a particular scenario—involving elements of "close quarter," "hostile moving target," and "gun"—while useful decision models in training materials need to be geared for a range of scenarios;
- though outdated, a number of sources that remain binding to lower level commands because they have not been superceded, continue to direct or imply attempts at disabling, if feasible.

Federal law enforcement training with firearms discourages shooting to wound. Still, knowledge of the body of federal law endorsed by Parks induces no clear

and eternal damnation of such shooting.

Parks' statement, "Justice Department Guidelines/U.S. Law . . . No shoot to wound" is not strictly accurate, as federal law enforcement deadly force policy does not actually forbid shooting to disable. Instead, it states:

> Attempts to shoot to wound or to injure are unrealistic and, because of high miss rates and poor stopping effectiveness, can prove dangerous for the officer and others. Therefore, shooting merely to disable is strongly discouraged.

The wariness of the federal law enforcement community about the notion of shooting to disable provides insight into how policy interacts with training and litigation while exposing subtle differences between police officers and soldiers.

This was brought into focus recently after a member of the Secret Service Emergency Response Team (ERT) shot in the knee a man who was brandishing a .38 caliber revolver along the south fence line of the White House. Though the shot struck the man in the right knee, point of aim was center mass; still, uninformed speculation that a federal agent may have aimed to disable suggested how menacing the intentional disabling with fire from a deadly weapon can be to the law enforcement establishment.

Whenever an especially well-trained agent—in the rare circumstances where he enjoys the luxuries of time, cover, concealment, standoff range, a good firing position, a suitable firearm, and a controlled heart rate—shoots a limb or even the handgun out of a suspect's hands, howls are understandably heard in police academies. Such a feat is risky, and a pattern of increased shooting to disable could someday cause judges to raise the bar for every agent accused of excessive force in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 complaint.

Parks' assertion that military lawyers have ignored the post-shooting litigation record is incorrect. Borrowing good ideas and techniques from domestic law enforcement cases is nothing new.

The leading Supreme Court cases of *Graham v. Connor* and *Tennessee v. Garner*, and their progeny, make good professional reading for military lawyers. Specific military examples from Beirut, Madden Dam, Brcko, Mijak, etc., though, are more useful for soldier training. This is because police objectives, organization, weapons, and operations are significantly different even from military counterparts in a peace support mission. Also, domestic litigation is raised in distinct constitutional and statutory contexts related to liability and immunity, so that the value of the litigation record is limited.

Commanders Do Lead

Commanders and judge advocates with experience in developing the right balance of initiative and restraint in soldiers heading to Kosovo and Bosnia learn that soldiers' typical questions about ROE, in addition to "when can I shoot?" are

- can you give me some real examples of when soldiers shot and when they did not?
- what happened to those soldiers?
- what are some ideas on other things I can do if I and my buddies are not immediately threatened?
- will we get any other equipment if controlling crowds becomes a problem?
- will the chain of command back me if I am trying to do the right thing and I shoot? if I don't shoot?

Through briefbacks, situational training exercises involving hostile roleplayers, and open, frank discussions with leaders built upon a foundation of trust and values, soldiers get answers to these questions and achieve the balance between initiative and restraint. They are expected to be aggressive and always to try to do the right thing and to understand that in spite of best efforts, mistakes will occur. They are told that honest mistakes will be underwritten by leaders as experiences that can help the entire task force get better at doing difficult missions. Because these expressions of support by leaders are consistent with the all-important supportive actions they see leaders actually take after a shooting or violent encounter, trust is further reinforced, and both extremes of tentativeness and overaggressiveness are mitigated. Soldiers are then not only fully prepared to defend themselves and accomplish unit missions, but they are also good representatives of American strength and fairness—eternal themes of national foreign policy.

While discussion of domestic excessive force prosecutions or civil liability cases involving deadly force may help prepare police agents for hostile cross-examination on the witness stand, is this precisely the approach commanders should use for the training of young soldiers? For one thing, although the Supreme Court has indeed developed a doctrine of "reasonableness" that sensibly refrains from second-guessing officers staring down the barrel of a gun, not all federal case results tend to quiet the fears of those who are enforcing the law and keeping the peace. When the onion of domestic litigation extolled by Parks is peeled back, it does not yield the claimed harvest of wisdom.

Command Backing

Parks suggests that Commanders are more inclined to court-martial a soldier after a shooting incident than to stand up against restrictive ROE before an operation. The facts do not appear to support this suggestion. Only two reported appellate cases involve charges founded in violations of the rules of engagement. Both of these cases—*U.S. v. McMonagle* and *U.S. v. Finsel*—arose in Panama, following Operation Just Cause.

Yet these two soldiers were subject to prosecution

because on the night in question they were drinking alcohol in violation of a no-drinking order, having sex with a woman in a local brothel despite an order prohibiting intimate contact with Panamanians, staging an elaborate mock firefight to cover up Sergeant Finsel's loss of a 9mm pistol, and finally killing an innocent bystander who fell victim to a wild shot. What the court termed "ROE" violations here—specifically violations of the commanding general's order relating to weapons safety—were incidental to other serious wrongs.

Commanders go to great lengths to avoid second-guessing soldiers' good faith use of deadly force in situations where ROE violations are rumored or informally alleged. Parks' inability to cite examples of criminal convictions for ROE violations is telling. Isolated instances in which post-shooting investigations have occurred, perhaps with the side-effect of chilling other soldiers, should serve as lessons to all that when possible, a review of the circumstances should be undertaken as an after-action review (AAR) rather than as an investigation.

Meanwhile, commanders aggressively challenge ROE issued by higher headquarters. The 1986 Honduras example cited by Parks, in which the 75th Ranger Regimental Commander insisted upon authority for live and chambered rounds, is representative rather than unusual. The Dayton process, which involved close involvement by senior military commanders and which resulted in a "robust" Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement for Peace, is another example in which political and diplomatic considerations were not permitted to dilute the soldiers' employment of force. The planning and orders-writing process that preceded operations in Kosovo, in which U.S. Army commanders refused to rest until they received interpretations of NATO ROE consistent with self defense and mission success, is another.

The Real Story in Brcko

Events in Brcko, Bosnia, in late August of 1997, reveal that commanders are stepping up and leading as their soldiers face tough decisions. Those events, among the ones summarized all-too-briefly by Parks at the start of his article, provide a helpful context within which to discern the true role of authority to use deadly force in a military operation. That role is actually often quite limited.

Around 2 a.m. on 28 August, sirens went off in the town of Brcko. Serb radio had announced that backers of a moderate elected Serb official were going to attempt to assume control over the local police station, and the siren served as a signal for the orchestrated demonstration to begin. A United States company task force, providing presence in the town during this anticipated change in civil power, was deployed into a perimeter and at several intersections. Within an hour, a large Serb crowd—about 400-strong—had gathered near the police station, armed with stones and clubs, and many Serbs were throwing stones, bricks, and flower pots at the American soldiers from rooftops. The company commander reported the growing disturbance in the town and began moving the task force to a reinforced position at the nearby Brcko, remaining in frequent contact with his battalion and division headquarters, which would soon have the town under close aerial observation.

Two dismounted squads of soldiers, overwatched by a Bradley fighting vehicle with their platoon sergeant in the turret, were starting their movement from an intersection when a member of the crowd climbed up on the Bradley and struck the platoon sergeant with a 2-by-4. The assailant then slipped down into the crowd. The company continued its orderly movement to the bridge, the protection of which was a continuing mission. There, soldiers and bridge were well protected by earth barriers, concertina wire, and more Bradleys.

By late morning, the crowd had grown to several thousand, many of whom had been bused to the demonstration by organizers loyal to Serb leader Karadzic. A few in the crowd had Molotov cocktails and CS canisters by this time, and women with babies and elderly people were being pushed toward the front of the crowd.

The company in Brcko was part of the Stabilization Force that was implementing the General Framework Agreement for Peace negotiated at Dayton. Control over the town was so contentious that it could not be decided within the Framework agreement; rather, it was deferred for decision through an arbitration process that both of the former warring factions were attempting to influence in August of 1997. The Serb Republic realistically felt that it could not exist without control of Brcko because the razor-thin Posavina Corridor on which Brcko rests is the sole land link between the two halves of the Serbs' state.

The Muslim-Croat Federation meanwhile felt it would be fatally weakened by the loss of the corridor. Such a loss would isolate Sarajevo from the rest of Europe and weaken the defenses of Tuzla, Bosnia's only major industrial city. Also, to give control to the Serbs would be to condone one of the war's clearest examples of "ethnic cleansing." On 28 August 1997, Brcko's population of 34,000 was 98 percent Serb. Just before the war, in 1992, the population had been 40 percent Muslim, 30 percent Serb and 30 percent Croat or "other."

The company commander maintained excellent command and control throughout the day. The angry crowd was kept at bay with a variety of measures, which included the conspicuous locking and loading of weapons, butt-strokes to individuals who came too close, small arms warning shots, CS grenades and cannisters, and eventually a burst of fire from an M240C 7.62 mm coaxially mounted machine gun, over the heads of the demonstrators and into a nearby building.

The discipline and resolve of the U.S. forces to remain on the bridge eventually caused the crowd leaders to call an end to the disturbance. Many of the soldiers sustained

wounds from rocks and tussles with the crowd, and five injuries—including the platoon sergeant hit with the 2-by-four—required medical treatment. One soldier, whose eye was injured, eventually left the Army with a 10 percent disability; but he has since re-enlisted and is stationed at Fort Bragg.

Although some in the international media portrayed the events as a victory for Serb nationalists because the platoon on the bridge did not kill any of the demonstrators, informed observers are convinced that Serbs would have achieved their objectives by inciting the soldiers to open fire on them.

Presumably, Parks believes U.S. soldiers should have fired on the crowd the moment they had legal authority to do so. This would have been the instant when rock throwers, Molotov cocktail hurlers, and club wielders gave the soldiers a reasonable belief that they were in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Setting aside the difficult question of which targets the soldiers should have shot if the threats were submerged in a crowd of unarmed persons, most could agree that legal authority to fire was present at various points throughout the long day—in which the crowd disturbances ebbed and flowed—and that excessive use of force allegations might have run a short course in a post-shooting process under domestic federal policy and law.

Part of the trouble with Parks' analysis is that soldiers were not holding fire because they feared a lack of legal authority, something they certainly also had under ROE disseminated and trained by the unit. They held fire rather because shooting would not have eliminated the threat, would have helped the Serbs achieve their destabilizing aims, would have precluded other techniques, and would have risked spinning the situation in Brcko out of control. The decorations the platoon sergeant and several other men received that day were well-deserved, like any other commendation given to a soldier for placing himself at risk to accomplish a greater good.

The greater good in this case was great indeed: in addition to bringing an end to the disturbance without the loss of a single soldier or human life, the fragile stability in the Balkans began to take hold. With the 2000 election in Belgrade of a regime committed to democratic reforms, the discipline, resolve, and situational awareness of our soldiers and leaders in Brcko and elsewhere in the Balkans paid enormous dividends for U.S. national security interests.

Another part of the trouble with Parks' thinking on this is how far he wishes to take the individual "right" to fire, an idea that competes with his exhortation that "commanders must lead." Soldiers in a platoon, more so than the policeman responding to a call with his partner in a patrol car, take action within a chain of command. The prerogative of individual decisionmaking occurs only as the soldier's actions—such as on sentry duty or during clearing operations in urban terrain—require him to operate independently. Soldiers are required to follow orders. The need for any operation against a determined and ingenious adversary to be coordinated and strongly led is one of the deepest military truths, and is captured in the principle "unity of command." Does Parks honestly believe that each individual soldier, continuing to enjoy clear communication with a sergeant or officer in charge, on the scene, and in better position to gauge the risk of fratricide, has the unqualified and personal right to fire at will in a Brcko Bridge scenario? One cannot tell by reading "Deadly Force Is Authorized." The distinction in the SROE between ROE for self-defense and ROE for "mission accomplishment" at least acknowledges that unit goals and individual self-interest are not identical.

We're All Hicks' Now

Parks criticizes commanders for ignoring Hicks' law. Yet while they may not know it by name, military commanders actually employ training techniques for use of force that are fully built upon the insight of Hicks' law and related concepts of information processing. Within the field of cognitive psychology, information-processing models describe three sequential stages for neural processing of information related to movement output:

(1) stimulus identification,
(2) response selection, and
(3) response programming.

All three of these stages require time. Hick's law, which relates to the second stage, states that response selection time increases as the number of alternatives increases.

Research shows that response selection time decreases as alternatives are ordered within schemas and that all three of the stages can be shortened through repetitive practice in a progressively more distracting environment, as well as through improved overall physical conditioning and other influences. Repetitive practice, however, is the hallmark of the Army's "performance-oriented training" system, and effective leaders of all services incorporate these same insights about information processing into drills for improving performance time and quality on a multitude of tasks.

A federal law enforcement agent, who is required by policy to consider nondeadly force and to issue a alternatives than a similarly armed and situated soldier. It is operant conditioning that quickens both the agent's and the soldier's firing at identified threats. In a close quarters firefight the options reduce to two: shoot-don't shoot. Repetition during firearms training must ensure that movements become natural and decisive. Neither a continuum of force options contained in a training aid nor a vague reference to nondeadly force options in a policy

must be permitted to cloud the issue at this deadly moment. Again, training rather than legal drafting is the key. verbal warning, if feasible, faces no fewer

Conclusion

Rules of engagement are not handicapping and endangering ground troops on peace-support missions because our troops are well organized, equipped, supported, armed, led, and—most significantly—trained. That training, though at times similar to the training of domestic law enforcement agents, is and needs to be geared to military rather than police functions. High-level policy statements as well as training materials regarding self defense and the authority to use deadly force must also recognize the distinction between soldiers and cops.

All is certainly not perfect with the present modes of transmitting guidance to units and soldiers on the use of force. Operations orders, soldier cards, and even specific vignettes continue to incorporate a variety of terms and verbal formulas addressing individual self defense. Force continuums lacking precautions against gradualism and "last resort" language describing deadly force are among the most troubling of these boilerplates. Vignettes also often lack grounding in real situations that have been faced by soldiers situated similarly to the training audience.

Commanders and staffs have wrestled, unsuccessfully to date, to find a standard way of disseminating ground force ROE not related to individual self-defense (i.e., geographic restrictions, weapons approval authorities, alert conditions, etc.). This lack of a stable language and format has impeded adoption of a uniform training approach in service schools and initial training bases.

Commanders reassure soldiers with uneven success that actions taken in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances will not be second-guessed with 20/20 hindsight, though most do an excellent job at this important leadership task. The ability of units and soldiers to transition immediately from low threat to high threat and wartime scenarios remains an elusive and essential goal. Not all units are doing enough marksmanship and close quarters combat training. The term "ROE" itself is applied to so many varied types of directives that greater precision in the military vocabulary is needed.

Yet improvement upon these and other aspects of the current system is frustrated rather than advanced by sensationalism. Because he ignites easy biases against other services, against peace support operations, against political and international constraints, and against lawyers, Hays Parks obscures the training imperatives that provide clues to a better way. Deadly force is indeed authorized, but a burning focus on legal authorization rather than training creates more heat than light.

A complete version of this article, complete with endnote references, appears at: ***http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/dodnato/jcll/****.*

About the Author

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Below is a partial list of unclassified reports from the JCLL JAAR database that discuss Rules of Engagement. Those with an "A" refer to a report from the Archived database and a "C" for the Current database. There are also many excellent classified reports available in both databases for detailed research by the reader.

Rules of Engagement

Number	*Db*	*Operation/Exercise*	*Title*
10349-47941	A	Uphold Democracy	Rules of Engagement- Parallel Planning
10353-10696	A	Uphold Democracy	Rules of Engagement—ROE Card
10444-51969	A	Philippine Coup Attempt	Rules of Engagement (ROE)
11113-22364	A	Restore Hope	Rules of Engagement
11116-07531	A	Restore Hope	Rules of Engagement
12957-13899	C	Unified Endeavor 96-1	Employment of Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare
20849-58635	C	Unified Endeavor 96-1	Rules of Engagement
31739-64159	A	Urgent Fury	Combat Patrolling
51356-08348	C	Cobra Gold 93	Development of Combined Rules of Engagement
70737-97109	C	Operation GTMO	Rules of Engagement (ROE)
72940-78400	C	Tandem Thrust 93	Rules of Engagement (ROE)
92640-23759	A	Uphold Democracy	Color-coded Rules of Engagement Cards
92860-41161	C	Eligible Receiver 92-1	Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Combat Search and Rescue – Basic Factors

Colonel Darrel Whitcomb
USAFR (Ret)

As the recent events in Serbia indicate, combat search and rescue (or CSAR) is still with us. The successful rescue of Vega 31, the pilot of an F-117, and Hammer 34, the pilot of an F-16, are exciting stories. Little has been published to date on these two operations because operations continue in this theater. But when the stories are told, readers will find much in common with SARs or CSARs from earlier conflicts.

From an historical perspective, these rescues seem to fit into long-term patterns from which lessons can be drawn and applied to future operations. Winston Churchill was a great student of history and once said, "The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you can see."[1] Aviation history resounds with stories of rescue. Perhaps some of that history would be useful to stimulate discussion to help us take a longer look at the subject

In any military operation, we must be prepared for the inevitable need for CSAR for any crew, group, or team that may be isolated behind enemy lines. This means anything from a single seat fighter to an AWACS to a Special Forces team.

The first and perhaps main point that needs to be made is that **CSARing is warfighting** –pure and simple. We cannot think of it separately. CSARing is just another form of battle. In that vein, the principles of war do apply. There will be a time and place for mass or economy of force and perhaps deception operations depending on the situation. Unity of command will be essential to focus the effort. Security will be critical because of the need for timely and focused action, and the realization that our enemy will try to counter our actions. Critical information and intelligence must be carefully guarded.

In a theater of operations where many actions, battles, and perhaps campaigns are taking place, CSARs will add to the fog and chaos of war. But as opposed to other types of operations where sometimes the objectives are not clear or easily understood, in a CSAR, **the objective is clear**, understood by all, and easily measurable. And it appeals to us on a human level.

It goes without saying that CSAR demands **absolute precision**. In a larger theater of operations, with so many other things going on, we have to literally reach into realms of organized chaos to pluck a specific person or persons out.

History is now showing that when an aircrew is down, **time is against us**. Our enemies realize we will make the effort for recovery and will try to capture our personnel. We must assume now that they know of our efforts and probably have some knowledge of our specific techniques. A recent test at Nellis AFB suggested that after two hours on the ground, the odds begin to turn against a successful rescue.[2]

Looking at all of this historically, there appear to be five things that, if accomplished, dramatically increase the chances of a successful rescue. Not guaranteed, mind you, because we are after all operating in the realm of conflict and chance.

1. Position. We have to find the survivor. That sounds very basic – but that is the point. It is absolutely fundamental to the whole process. As a recent CSAR report stated, "accurate coordinates are critical" to recovery.[3] Remember, the "S" in CSAR stands for "search." In the old days of Southeast Asia, we used to send in a Forward Air Controller or a pair of A-1aircraft to sweep the area to find the survivor(s). Today, with sophisticated antiaircraft radars, guns, and missiles, there are assets, both theater and national, to locate the survivor(s) so we can properly marshal our forces for the recovery.

Position appears to have value on four levels:

Strategically – the location of the survivor(s) in relation to national boundaries can have a big impact on the relationship of nations, Rules of Engagement to be followed, and such things as the need for overflight privileges. In Southeast Asia we had different operating rules for South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. There were no rescue operations for crews lost over China.

Operationally – Where is the survivor(s) in relation to what else is going on in the larger conflict? Will a focused CSAR operation in a particular time and place interfere with some other operation, or can some aspect of that operation conceivably be used to aid the recovery effort?

Tactically – What is going to have to be done to get into the immediate area of the survivor(s) to effect the recovery? This requires classic intelligence preparation to understand what will need to be done to counter enemy attempts to defeat the CSAR effort.

Precision – What do we have to do to facilitate that actual link up of the survivor and his recovery vehicle? This is the most critical event in the entire process. Once the recovery vehicle is committed it must expeditiously maneuver to and link up with the survivor(s), and then depart the area.

2. Communication. We must be able to communicate with the survivor(s) and those agencies necessary to plan, coordinate, command, and execute the rescue. The Korean War showed us that we needed to equip our downed crews with survival radios.[4] Preplanning can be very effective here in specifically organizing how disparate units and elements, drawn together on short notice to

execute a CSAR, can quickly come together. The air tasking order (ATO) and special instructions (SPINS) can be very useful for this. So can common terms understood by all. Conversely, code words understood by only one element of the CSAR effort but not by others can sow confusion at absolutely the wrong moment. During the intensity of a CSAR event, we must be able to exclude those who cannot contribute. Useless information or chatter is just communication jamming.

3. We have to have a recovery vehicle. They do not just happen. We always think of that big green rescue helicopter - we classically call them Jolly Greens - as the vehicle. Think beyond that. Naval vehicles, ground vehicles, maybe even a ground team can do the job. And it does not matter what patch that vehicle wears. The vehicle is not important. The recovery is.

4. We need to have **smart survivors**. As a recent CSAR report states, "Survivor actions are an integral part of the success or failure of any rescue operation."[5] The history of successful rescues resounds with this theme.

5. We must be able to achieve around that survivor the necessary level of **situational superiority** to control events long enough to effect the recovery. One of the lessons learned from the Korean War was that air superiority is critical to the successful operation of a recovery task force.[6] This necessary superiority is really three dimensional, for some of the most serious threats today are ground based. This is what makes CSARs unique, what actually separates them from SARs. The first four points actually apply to just about any rescue operation. But again, in combat, our actions will be opposed by the enemy. We will have to impose our will. We will have to be able to control events long enough in the survivor's area to allow the recovery vehicle to make the recovery and depart. This is battle. This is warfighting.

There are many historical examples from which we can learn:

World War II.

In February 1944, a carrier task force attacked the Japanese forces at Truk Atoll. In the battle, a Grumman F-5F from the USS Essex was shot down. The pilot ditched his aircraft in the lagoon surrounding the islands. The flight leader watched him go down and fixed his position. He then called back to the Essex and requested air-sea rescue. Another ship in the task force, the USS Baltimore, launched an OS2U-3 Kingfisher amphibious aircraft to recover the pilot. However, before the aircraft could arrive, the flight lead spotted a Japanese destroyer entering the lagoon apparently to capture the pilot. He led his flight on repeated attacks on the ship and drove it away, maintaining enough situational superiority around the survivor to facilitate his rescue.[7]

Korea.

In June, 1951, a pilot ditched his flak damaged Mustang fighter in the Taedong River 50 miles northeast of Pyongyang. His flight mates saw him swimming in the river and called for a rescue aircraft. An SA-16 Albatross flown by 1Lt John Najarian responded and flew to their position. The covering Mustangs, joined by other flights, suppressed the enemy guns along both shores as Najarian landed in the cold waters and picked up the wet pilot. But the sun had gone down and the current was sweeping the Albatross toward high power lines across the river. To help Najarian see the wires, the mustang pilots turned on their landing lights and flew just above him as he made his take off under the wires.[8]

Southeast Asia.

There are so many stories which deserve to be told.

1. Oyster 01Bravo. In May, 1972, an F-4 was shot down north west of Hanoi. The navigator, 1Lt Roger Locher, evaded for 23 days before he was able to establish communication with friendly forces. They were then able to positively locate him. Rescue elements in the theater responded, but were driven off by enemy forces. The commander of 7th Air Force, General John Vogt, directed that the entire next day's effort be directed to establish enough local superiority to support the rescue operation. The effort was mounted and Locher was successfully rescued.[9]

2. Bat 21 Bravo/Nail38 Bravo. This huge SAR, the largest of the war, took place in April 1972. Communications were established with the survivors and they were easily located. Rescue forces were available, but we could not establish local superiority for a rescue helicopter to recover them. Indeed, several were shot down in the effort. The two survivors were recovered by a small ground team, which used stealth and very precise fire support to recover the two men.[10]

The Gulf War.

On January 21, 1991, an F-14, Slate 46, was downed by an Iraqi missile. Intermittent radio contact was established with the pilot, but his position was only generally known, and the radio intercept officer was captured. An MH-53 piloted by Captain Tom Trask proceeded deep into Iraq. In the general vicinity of the survivor, the MH-53 was joined by a flight of two A-10s. They were able to locate the survivor and vector the helicopter crew to him. Enemy troops were in the area, including some trucks that appeared to be homing in on the radio transmissions of the pilot. Captain Paul Johnson, the lead A-10 pilot attacked the enemy forces and vehicles, which were only 150 meters away from the Navy pilot, and facilitated his recovery.[11]

Bosnia.

EBRO 33. This nonrecovery of a French Mirage crew shot down in late August 1995, during NATO Operation Deliberate Force, is also useful. Radio contact was never established with the survivors and their location was never determined. Rescue forces were available and sufficient force was possibly available to establish enough local superiority. But the crew was never recovered and in fact, friendly forces were injured in the search efforts.[12]

En Toto, these events demonstrate the efficacy of our five noted points. There are, of course, so many other missions – too many to include in this short piece. In general, however, we must assume any rescue in enemy territory will be opposed. History appears to be giving us a clear vector for handling this contingency. If these factors are properly dealt with, the odds of success tend to swing in our favor. But again, no rescue is guaranteed.

After all, CSARing is warfighting!

Footnotes:
1. Humes, James C., *Churchill Speaker of the Century,* Scarborough Book, New York, NY, 1982. Page 269.
2. This data comes from the Joint CSAR Joint Test and Evaluation recently completed at Nellis AFB, NV.
3. Joint Services S.E.R.E. Agency, F-16 Lessons Learned, Introduction, December 3, 1999, Page 17.
4. Futrell, Robert F., *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953,* Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC, 1983, page 583.
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10. Whitcomb, Darrel, *The Rescue of Bat 21*, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1998.
11. Interview with Lt Col Tom Trask, February 17, 2000.
12. Press conference by Admiral Leighton Smith, Naples, Italy, September 22, 1995. Go to: http://www.hriorg/news/misc-news/95-09-22 .misc.html.

About the Author:

Col (ret) Darrel Whitcomb, USAFR, graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1969 with a BS in European Studies. After graduation from pilot training, he flew three tours in Southeast Asia as a cargo pilot and forward air controller. Following duty as a T-38 instructor pilot, he transferred to the Air Force Reserve in 1977. There, he flew the A-37 and A-10 at New Orleans and Kansas City. Subsequently, he served on the Air Staff and Joint Staff followed by duty in the office of the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, the Air Command and Staff College, and Air Force Doctrine Center, where he retired in 1999. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College, and has published articles in many professional journals. He is also the author of one book, The Rescue of Bat 21. Additionally, he is on contract to the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency where he researches and lectures on CSAR.

Editor's note: I'd like to thank Colonel Whitcomb for his efforts in writing this article for the JCLL Bulletin. He is a noted lecturer and author, whose book, The Rescue of Bat 21, about the combat search and rescue of an RB-57 crew in Viet Nam, was made into an award-winning film.

Below is a partial list of unclassified reports from the JCLL JAAR database that discuss Combat Search and Rescue. Those with an "A" refer to a report from the Archived database and a "C" for the Current database.

Combat Search And Rescue

Number	Db	Operation/Exercise	Title
31655-51121	A	Desert Shield/Storm	Joint CSAR Doctrine
56927-22346	C	Desert Thunder	Lesson Learned – Personnel Planning Recovery In Compressed Planning
56027-28653	C	Desert Thunder	Observation – SOF Personnel Recovery Concepts of Operation Doctrine
56927-39237	C	Desert Thunder	Lesson Learned – Establish SOF Personnel Recovery C2 Procedures
56927-73042	C	Desert Thunder	Observation – Joint Special Operations Liaison Element In Theater Plan
61976-80478	A	Desert Shield/Storm	Search and Rescue Mission Requirements

Editors Note: *This article was previously published by the US Air Force's Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, as Maxwell Paper No 12. Due to its length, this article has been broken into four sections. This is section three. The final section will be published in the next issue of the JCLL Bulletin. The first section analyzed the role of doctrine in the integration process at the operational level. It also gave an assessment of basic guidelines, terminology, and control measures. The second section evaluated doctrine and the results were contrasted with lessons learned and current operational issues arriving at shortfalls or fallacies in doctrine. In this third section, doctrinal control measures will be further analyzed solidifying doctrinal shortfalls. Finally, the fourth section will provide corrective action to resolve the issues.*

INTEGRATING JOINT OPERATIONS BEYOND THE FSCL: IS CURRENT DOCTRINE ADEQUATE? (Section 3)

By Dwayne P. Hall, LTC, USA

Deep Operations (Battle) Terminology

When XVIII Airborne Corps began deep-battle operations, it became apparent there's a great disconnect between the Air Force and Army concerning the use of Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) and application of the FSCL. The Army doctrinally uses BAI to allow the corps commander to shape the battlefield…The Air Force prefers Air Interdiction (AI) because it allows them greater flexibility…[1]

Deep (Battle) Operations

The area beyond the FSCL has no universally accepted name. Table 2 provides terms associated with operations that occur in this area with indications of where they may appear in relation to the FSCL. In the absence of an official title, the area is labeled according to the functions performed.

The Army labels this area "deep operations."[2] The term "deep battle" is used throughout this study and some Army references to limit the scope to physical combat. Army deep operations focus on the enemy's C2, logistics, and firepower. Deep operations occur within a ground commander's AO, but are more of a function than an effect. Like interdiction, deep operations focus on uncommitted enemy forces. Deep operations are conducted in conjunction with close operations for a synergistic effect.

The Army further defines deep operations by target sets. For example, in the defense, the corps' initial deep operation will normally focus on the Combined Arms Army (CAA) units and support systems to the rear of the main defensive belt.[3] This technique assists the corps in isolating the current close battle and fighting the enemy in depth.

In general, Air Force references refer to functions or effects as opposed to a particular target set or place on the battlefield close support, interdiction, and strategic attack. However, two references, JFACC Primer and AFM 2-1, refer to interdiction occurring beyond the FSCL (a particular place). In Air Force doctrine, interdiction disrupts, delays, or destroys an enemy's military potential before it can be used against friendly forces.[4] The area beyond the FSCL then is simply a place where the Air Force conducts interdiction, strategic attack, counter air, and so on - it's where the JFACC operates.

Joint doctrinal manuals used in this study do not define a deep battle or operation area. There is also no reference to the FSCL's use as a boundary or delineation line for interdiction. Joint doctrine refers to two areas that do encompass the FSCL (the deep battle area), but on a much larger scale. These two geographical areas are the area of responsibility and area of operation.[5] Note that both are general, referring to the overall battlefield rather than any particular part.

Area of Responsibility (AOR) - ***the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.***

Area of Operation (AO) - ***an operational area is defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.***

Interdiction

Great disconnect between the Air Force and Army concerning the use of BAI and the application of the FSCL…The terms BAI and AI need clarification.[6]

The only common term or function that encompasses the activities around the FSCL is *interdictio*n. This is because of the broad scope of interdiction and the fact that it is a function, aimed at effects. As a function, interdiction has specific objectives.

> Interdiction aims to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.[7]

The JFC should not apply strict geographic boundaries to interdiction but should plan for its theater-wide application, coordinating across boundaries or between sub-elements, to take full advantage of the effect of interdiction at the operational level.[8] When applied at the tactical or operational levels, near the FSCL, interdiction is provided by any Service, with any weapon system. It is directed against follow-on-forces, air defenses, supplies, C3, and other targets that are not already affecting friendly operations. The flexibility included in the interdiction concept also fosters varying interpretations on its application (Table 2).

	Joint	Army	Air Force
Purpose (Why)	Divert, Disrupt, Delay, or Destroy Enemy Surface Military Potential	Destroys Enemy Forces; Delays and Disrupts Maneuver; Diverts Resources	Diverts, Disrupts, Delays, or Destroys Enemy Surface Military Potential
Application (Where)	Theaterwide - No Boundaries	Short of and beyond FSCL	Beyond FSCL
Control Authority (Who)	JFC - Normally Appoints JFACC for Overall Interdiction; Ground Commander within His AO	JFC; Ground Commander within His AO	JFACC Theaterwide and beyond FSCL or Commander with Force at Risk beyond FSCL
Focus (What)	JFC's Concept	JFC Concept or Ground Commander's Concept when Ground ops is Decisive Initiative	JFC/JFACC Concept
Timing (Where)	Prior to Effective Use against Friendly Forces	Prior to Effective Use against Friendly Forces	Prior to Use against Friendly Forces

Table 2. Interdiction Interpretations

As revealed in Table 2, the interdiction concept is interpreted differently. Although the definition is straight-forward, it is all but impossible to universally apply when there are as many varying interpretations. Because of its universal application in all parts of the battlespace, it will inevitably cross Service roles and responsibility lines, creating additional controversy. The FSCL is not a solution for separating these overlaps because of varying interpretation of its functions.

The varying interpretations of Close Air Support verses BAI verses AI, also had a negative impact on operations during Operation Desert Storm. Initially, the FSCL was along the Saudi-Iraqi border (the berm). As a result, all mission, to include reconnaissance, required clearance through the Air Force. Since the Air Force position was that anything beyond the FSCL was interdiction, and, interdiction was the domain of the JFACC, ground commanders were hampered from setting the conditions for the attack.

> Because the Air Force absolutely would not fly short of the FSCL before G-Day, we kept the FSCL in close to facilitate air attack of division and corps high priority targets. This caused two problems. Every fire mission or AH-64 attack beyond the FSCL had to be carefully and painstakingly cleared with the Air Force. Even counterfire required this lengthy process. Equally bad, air sorties beyond the FSCL were completely the domain of the Air Force. VII Corps could nominate targets beyond the FSCL, but could never be sure they would be attacked.[9]

There are over ten similar issues raised by ground commanders on an inability to conduct "deep operations." This is partially due to a lack of joint recognition for deep battle as an operational concept. The area beyond the border (berm) or FSCL, immediately to the ground forces' front, an area that they would be required to attack into, was virtually inaccessible for reconnaissance or preparation. In essence, the area beyond the FSCL was an area that might be called "No Man's land, being a part of Grand Tartary."[10] ODS ended on a note of frustration on the part of both Services over this issue.

Graphic Control Measures

> The situation prompted the violation of established doctrine and development of new fire support control measures (Reconnaissance Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL)) and Artillery Deconfliction Line, and TTP for fire support at Army level during Operation Desert Storm.[11]

In order to obtain the synergistic effects of joint, simultaneous, deep operations, control measures must be clear and concise, universally understood, and capable of rapid dissemination when the situation changes. Commanders, Army and Air Force, found themselves wanting for fire control measures to expedite their operations during ODS. Basic graphical control measures were inadequate for integrating, synchronizing, and facilitating unit or Service operations. Measures implemented during the operation were beneficial for the most part, but also caused confusion because they were non-doctrinal and had no universally understood definitions or applications.

After reviewing joint and service doctrine, there are three universally used graphical control measures associated with deep operations: 1) Boundaries; 2) Phase Lines; and 3) FSCL. The FSCL was discussed earlier.

Doctrinal Control Measures

Boundary. The basic *boundary* has existed since ground forces. Its use is universally understood and is not contested except in the case of interdiction. The official definition provides clarity to its use.

> Boundary - A line which delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.[12]

Note that by official definition, air is unconstrained by the boundary. It can therefore be interpreted that Interdiction is not limited or controlled by the boundary.

Phase Line. The *phase lin*e, like the boundary, is universally used and understood and not contested.

> Phase Line - A line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually a terrain

feature extending across the zone of action.[13]

Note that the phase line has military-wide application according to joint doctrine. Additionally, it may apply across an entire zone of action for control and coordination. According to its definition, the phase line is more appropriate for dividing responsibilities than the FSCL. However, all Services are reluctant to use it because of its proliferation and use as a routine, ground, tactical control measure.

In summary, there is no universally accepted and understood control measures appropriate to delineate responsibilities for interdiction. By definition, the Phase Line is usable, however, like the boundary, it is considered a ground or maneuver control measure. The FSCL is not intended for that purpose, has too many different meanings, and is intended as a tactical (rapid changes) line as opposed to an operational one. As stated in the definition, the boundary technically applies only to ground forces; the phase line applies to all military operations, but is not universally accepted other than in the ground maneuver community.

Doctrinal Implications

A survey conducted after ODS revealed that participants (staffs) felt that control measure *did* ensure cooperation between forces.[14] One hundred seventy-nine (179) voted "yes," 144 voted "no." When questioned if they were too restrictive, 157 replied "yes," 1093 replied "no." A follow-up question asked respondents to "describe any difficulties with control measures." Of the 401 responding, the most prominent issue was difficulties with the FSCL. The non-doctrinal use of this control measure caused great confusion and concern. What is unclear is from the surveys is whether control measures facilitated control and cooperation between ground forces, or Army and Air Forces. Either way, it supports findings in lessons learned that the FSCL is a universally "misunderstood" measure.

Notes.

1. JULLS, 55 [shortened form].
2. FM 100-15, *Corps Operation*s, September 1989, 3-1.
3. Ibid., 5-12.
4. AFM 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Forc*e, vol. I, March 1992, 12-13.
5. JP 1-02, 148 [shortened form].
6. JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operation*s, 11 December 1990, II-1.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., II-4.
9. Zook, 115, [shortened form].
10. Treavor Royle, *A Dictionary of Military Quotation*s, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 161..22
11. JULLS, 15, [shortened form].
12. JP 1-02,58, [shortened form].
13. Ibid., 317.
14. JULLS, 42, [shortened form].

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The Joint Lessons Learned Program… Building a Common Framework

By Colonel Egon F. Hawrylak

This structure need not be unique to the military and can be applied equally One of the most misused terms in our military lexicon today is the term "lessons learned." It is used to describe various types of inputs, products, and functions all associated with the "lessons learned" process within the Joint and Service Communities. Though both individuals and organizations use the term liberally, there is no clearly agreed upon definition, framework, or commonality of process. Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, omits the term, which further complicates its use.

Then what is a lesson learned? In the context of the framework proposed by this paper, it is a resolved shortcoming, deficiency, or problem that has been incorporated into planning, doctrine, tactics, and training, enabling a task to be accomplished to standard. It becomes one of two outcomes, the other being a Lesson Identified, produced by this proposed framework. Of the two outcomes, the Lesson Learned is the most important.

This paper will present a framework for the lessons learned process to provide a commonality of purpose, terminology and structure. It will tie the framework to the principal components of the process and identify the critical role of the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL). A portion of the information offered in this article is not currently part of the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) as governed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25A, but is currently under consideration for incorporation by the JLLP Configuration Management Board.

Building a Common Framework…

In building a common framework three critical considerations were endorsed. First, the framework needed to establish a concise purpose to justify the resources allocated by commands for this function. Second, it needed to provide for a common structure in which universal terms and definitions could be applied consistently regardless of the type organization or stated mission, and third, be simple so as to be universally adaptable by, and interchangeable between, the Joint and Service Communities (figure 1).

The purpose of a Joint Lessons Learned Program is twofold. First and foremost, it exists to identify potential issues of joint warfighting significance, which are eventually forwarded to an appropriate issue resolution process. The JLLP provides a process to capture significant observations across a spectrum of organizations performing diverse operations for the purpose of developing issues, which, when assigned to an issue resolution process, can resolve a joint warfighting shortcoming. This primary mission justifies the finite resources committed by an organization for the collection, analysis, and distribution of observations.

A key challenge in establishing a common structure is defining the terminology. The terms must be standardized and simple to be understood by all users of the process. Beginning at the point of entry, the information gathered during a specified event, regardless of type, is simply called an "observation," defined as a circumstance observed by an individual and documented based on the observer's level of expertise. It is nothing more than a data point as seen through the eyes of an observer. It is not raw data. An observation captured by an experienced person in a particular area, regardless of grade, should be considered accordingly.

Once the observations for a particular event are collected, analysis is conducted. Analysis is defined as the process of examining, organizing, and evaluating information, identifying component parts, relationships and trends to establish facts for subsequent use. The level of analysis is determined by the organization conducting the review based on its allocated resources. Analysis may simply take the form of a review, which vets the aggregated observations, or be a much more detailed examination, as is conducted by the JCLL. The finding reached after the analysis is complete is called a "lesson" that, within the Joint Lessons Learned Community, either becomes an "issue" to be resolved or "knowledge" to be shared.

The determination of a potential joint warfighting issue, as a result of analysis, is the primary purpose of the Joint Lessons Learned Program. Identified issues are worked at each level in the process. At the organizational level this may include updating a Standing Operating Procedure or an Operations Plan. At the JCLL level it involves the analysis of observations from all participating organizations to determine potential issues and trends requiring mediation by a Joint Staff issue resolution process, such as the Chairman's Remedial Action Program. Only after an identified issue has been incorporated into planning, doctrine, tactics, and training, enabling a task to be accomplished to standard, is it considered

a Lesson Learned.

The secondary purpose of the Joint Lessons Learned Program is knowledge sharing, defined as information, which has been perceived, discovered or learned, as a result of some level of analysis. Rather than a Lesson Learned, the process produces a Lesson Identified, defined as acquired knowledge used to improve a task, which does not require a formal change to plans, doctrine, tactics, or training. The Lesson Identified provides the Joint Warfighter information through various forums, such as articles, vignettes, golden nuggets or other like products, to highlight important joint observations or trends. Publications, such as the Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin, provide an excellent means to disseminate this type of information.



Figure 1

The Components of a Lessons Learned Program…

There are four primary component parts of the Joint Lessons Learned Program: the User, Inputs, Process, and Outputs (figure 2). Each is interrelated and designed to structure the collection, analysis, and distribution of proposed observations through an iterative process. The component parts, regardless of the organizational level or type of operation (training or contingency operation), are never omitted. In a typical CINC operation the Joint Task Force (JTF) or User, for example, actively collects and records observations (called Inputs) from assigned commands, organizations, and the JTF staff. At the conclusion of the operation, or designated time period for ongoing operations, the inputs are processed, analyzed, and eventually distributed to the next level — in this example, the CINC's Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR). The OPR at each level (Component, JTF, CINC, and the JCLL) is responsible for processing the observations to ensure accuracy and completeness, conducting a level of analysis, and distributing the final report to the next higher level in accordance with an established suspense.



Figure 2

Analysis must occur at each level and be as detailed as organizational resources permit. Analysis is not the sole responsibility of the JCLL. It must occur at each level for three very important reasons. First, to provide a vetting mechanism to ensure each observation is administratively accurate and sufficiently detailed to capture the essence of the observed event. Second, to identify potential issues and trends at the organizational level, which will require corrective action through an internal issue resolution process and to share knowledge that may be beneficial to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Third, to identify potential issues and trends, which require resolution at a higher level. Analysis is an integral part of the lessons learned process.

Once the analysis is complete, the organization maintains a repository of the lessons and distributes those, which are not organization-specific, to the next higher level. Their output now becomes the input for the next higher level, and coupled with observations from the internal staff and assigned elements, continues this iterative process of collecting, analyzing, maintaining and eventually distributing an output to the next higher level.

This structure need not be unique to the military and can be applied equally to the interagency. The Department of State, for example, replacing Components, JTFs and CINCs with Consular Offices, Embassies, and Main State, can incorporate the same lesson learned structure to collect, analyze, and disseminate State-related lessons. Utilizing the same proposed framework, State can internally institutionalize a common purpose, terminology and structure, while ensuring interoperability with the Department of Defense for interagency-related issues. In doing so, it also focuses on the issues to be resolved and the knowledge to be shared.

The JCLL Value Added…

The Joint Center for Lessons Learned, as the Department of Defense's executive agent for the Joint Lessons Learned Program, serves as the single integrator of all observations. It is the only organization positioned to accomplish this task, serving as an enabler to Joint Issue Resolution and Knowledge Sharing processes. Through this critical "enabling" role an observation submitted by one CINC, and subsequently surfaced by one or more other CINCs, can be identified as a joint warfighting issue. The JCLL, in essence, synthesizes observations across CINCs into a single joint picture of issues, trends, and knowledge. Furthermore, through integrated analysis with the joint experimentation process the JCLL, as the single source integrator of exercise and operational events, is in a position to recommend potential near-term Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership & Education, Materiel, People, and Facility changes to joint capabilities. In doing so, it assists in bridging the gap between current capabilities and Joint Vision 2020.

Summary…

This proposed framework is offered to provide the Joint and Service Community commonality of purpose, terminology, and structure. Using the principal components of the JLLP, the framework provides a process, which captures significant observations across a spectrum of organizations performing diverse missions, for the purpose of conducting analysis to produce joint lessons. These lessons, in turn, either become issues to be resolved or knowledge to be shared. The primary mission of the JLLP is to identify issues of joint warfighting significance. This mission justifies the finite resources allocated by organizations for the collection, analysis, and distribution of observations. The secondary purpose is one of knowledge sharing. Knowledge used to improve a task without requiring a formal change to plans, doctrine, tactics, or training. The Joint and Service Communities must proactively collect, analyze, and distribute observations with the primary purpose of identifying warfighting issues so ultimately, they may be resolved. Remember: those who fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it.

About the Author

Colonel Egon F. Hawrylak is a Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Toledo and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Infantry in June 1974. Colonel Hawrylak has held numerous command and staff positions at various levels, and was the Commander of the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment during both Operation Continue Hope in Mogadishu, Somalia, and Operation Uphold/Restore Democracy, in Haiti. His awards include the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Expert Infantryman Badge, the Ranger Tab, the Parachute Badge, the Air Assault Badge, the Pathfinder Badge, the Army Staff Identification Badge, and the Joint Staff Identification Badge. Colonel Hawrylak recently completed a tour on the Joint Staff, Joint Exercise and Assessment Division, J7, where he was responsible for Joint Staff oversight of the Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Program. He is presently the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for the U.S. Army Military District of Washington, D.C..

JCLL, Experiment Lessons, and Continuous Transformation

Matthew R. Slater
Military Analyst, JCLL

The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) is considering a decision that will broaden the organization's focus. The JCLL already receives lessons from joint force experiences gleaned from real-world operations (RWO) and training exercises. Now JCLL is forming a consensus on the most beneficial method to gather lessons from joint experiments. If the JCLL's foray into experiments proves fruitful, it is likely that changes will be made to the Joint Lessons Learned Program that JCLL oversees in order to allow the inclusion of experiment lesson collection. The author of this article is deeply involved in the challenge of incorporating experimentation into the lessons learned process, and this article is not indicative of JCLL policy, but rather representative of the views of the author in addressing the experimentation issue.

There is a strong rationale for the decision to bring experiment lessons into the JCLL fold. The JCLL receives lessons from the CINCs and makes them available to the joint community. The purpose of this system is to enable U.S. Forces, at the joint level, to become a self-learning organization, meaning:

> "the continuous testing of experience and the transformation of that experience into knowledge—accessible to the whole organization, and relevant to its core purpose."[1]

An organization can only learn from its experiences, and experience in the military context is imparted by certain kinds of events, specifically the triad of RWOs, training exercises, and experiments. If the lessons from the collective military experience can be collected in a physical and/or virtual location, and made easily accessible to U.S. Forces, then self-learning, or organizational learning, is enabled. Notice that a distinction is made between enabling self-learning and the client automatically absorbing the information. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned has recognized that it is not in its purview to force the Force to learn: Our ambitions are to make the collective military experience as accessible as possible to joint warfighters, as needed.

Enabling self-learning contributes to the goal of transformation of the Force as outlined in the *Joint Vision 2020*. Ideally, the transformation of U.S. Forces does not end in 2020. If reforms are implemented properly, then transformation becomes a continuous process that is counter to the popular thought that *Joint Vision 2020* is a culminating moment of a transformation process. *Joint Vision 2020's* value is not as an end-point, but an important mile-marker for U.S. Forces, a vision that may or may not be fulfilled. An important element of transformation entails changing the culture of the Force to embrace self-learning. The JCLL should seek to be an important enabler of continuous transformation in the joint community.

There are challenges for JCLL to overcome. One of the difficulties inherent to incorporating experiment lessons into the JCLL database is that experiments are of a different genus than other forms of military experience. For that matter, RWOs and training exercises also differ from each other, and all three types of events can be different from events within their own class. For example, training exercises are designed to test unit level proficiency. Since the composition of units and criteria to be measured during the training exercise can vary on an annual basis, it is difficult to directly compare training exercise results and achieve a common lesson. Similarly, RWOs encompass a variety of actions that are not necessarily compatible in a comparative analysis. Those studying a real-world peacekeeping operation such as *Operation Restore Democracy* will be hard-pressed to find lessons relevant to movement or firepower. Experiment formats can vary from seminar based wargame variations, such as USJFCOM's *Unified Vision 01* that followed a seminar template, to USPACOM's *Kernal Blitz* that involved a live exercise.

Compared to other joint experiences, at first blush experimentation seems to be plagued with a high-level of artificialities. In other words, some might be prejudiced against lessons from experiments because the lessons appear to be more contrived than lessons from RWOs or training exercises. Many experiments, such as those in the seminar format, can rely on simulations and fictitious opposition and friendly forces. However, the individuals who generate experiment lessons under this kind of format are typically hand-chosen due to their experience or mental acuity. Therefore, in some ways, experiment lessons maintain lower artificialities than initially assumed since its lessons are typically well-developed conclusions by select members of the four Services.

Besides arguing the quality of experiment lessons vis-à-vis other forms of military experience, RWOs and training exercises may be problematic, each in their own unique fashion. Researching RWOs to apply lessons to current operations has pitfalls. They were executed in the past, meaning different weapons systems, C2 structures, and even doctrine may have been employed that make it difficult to construct direct comparisons to the modern context. Training exercises may utilize contrived scenarios and opposition forces. As previously stated, they are primarily conducted to evaluate the proficiency of units within commands, each unit identifying internal training objectives to be examined. Although findings based on unit fitness is helpful, they do not directly contribute to

valuable joint lessons since the conditions of each exercise and the composition of units make every exercise unique.

Therefore, the question must be asked: can analysis on the seemingly disparate set of experiences, each with differing levels of artificialities, still be a useful tool to enable organizational learning? With the aid of careful analysis and the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), the answer is yes. Thankfully, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided unified joint tasks whose classification scheme cuts across all military experience. The UJTL is already used by the Joint After-Action Report on-line database that promotes self-learning within the joint force. If experiment lessons are incorporated into the JCLL database, Defense Department organizations could be able to search for all lessons applicable to particular tasks as classified by UJTL classification.[2] The Universal Joint Task List is admittedly focused on the here and now, however major military tasks in the UJTL, such as firepower, sustainment, command and control, and intelligence, among others are generally applicable throughout the history of warfare, and will likely remain relevant for some years to come.[3]

The JCLL should not only collect lessons from experiment results, enabling them to be shared across the military community, but could conceivably collect lessons in regard to exercise and experiment administration. All CINCs are involved in experiment activity, but there is no central collection and dissemination system designed to take advantage of the knowledge gained from running each event, among the CINCs, or even within their commands. Lacking such a system to enable self-learning, every CINC staff is forced at some level to "reinvent the wheel" when executing events. The potential savings in both resources and manpower from the goal of supporting self-learning in the joint force could prove to be a tremendously valuable effort, paying dividends for well into the 21st Century.

About the Author

Matt Slater is a military analyst, employed by Cubic Applications, working in the Joint Center for Lessons Learned since May 2001. He previously worked as a contractor for USJFCOM-J9, Joint Experimentation, on the Rapid Decisive Operations integrating concept and the Futures Branch. He co-authored several papers for Joint experimentation while in this capacity. He is currently completing his Ph.D. in International Relations at Old Dominion University. His dissertation is titled *Latin American-U.S. Security Relations Under The Power Asymmetry Divide.*

[1] Peter M. Senge, et.al., eds., *The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), p. 49.

[2] The connection between experiments and UJTLs is not the least bit tenuous. Joint Experimentation (USJFCOM J9) utilizes UJTLs in their integration process and *Joint Vision 2010* utilized the UJTL "…in describing capabilities required to execute the National Military Strategy found in the Joint Strategy Review and JV 2010 Concept of Future Operations." *Universal Joint Task List: Version 4.0*, October 1, 1999, p. 12.

[3] A process is in place to produce revised UJTLs to maintain their usefulness to the joint community. Warfighting concepts have not significantly changed from Version 3.0 to the upcoming Version 5.0, further reinforcing the notion that UJTL s retain their basic value over time.

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